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Law and the Circular Economy 
A circular economy reuses waste products to minimise the loss of materials. This article 
analyses circular economy, and outlines potential research avenues. A distinction between 
sharing economies and circular economies is suggested, and English law’s capacity to deal 
with waste in accordance with circular economic ideas is considered. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Circular economies focus on minimum input and output costs, along with limiting disposal in 
favour of reuse and/or recycling of goods. The doctrinal structures of the English property 
law regime concerning ownership (specifically, the common-law concepts of relative title and 
possessory title) and abandonment treats waste products in a way theoretically responsive to 
and supportive of circular economy, by legally transforming waste into objects suitable for 
integration into circular economies at the margins of supply. 
 The next section outlines the circular economy, both in terms of its cross-disciplinary 
intellectual development and in terms of its current positive status within political and third-
sector institutions and organisations. Section three provides a first detailed analysis of the 
possible implications of circular economic ideas for English law. Section four considers the 
importance of a suitable legal framework for the reintegration of waste into circular 
economies by demonstrating the impact of a combination of three principles of English 
personal property law. This will show the suitability of English doctrine as a framework for 
circular economic practices. Section five concludes. 
2. THE CIRCULAR ECONOMY 
Circular economy is strikingly straightforward and easy to understand. It is the opposite of 
linear economy, which functions on the basis of make, use, and dispose. Instead, it is a 
system of interconnected loops in the production, use, and recycling of goods. What is 
common to all descriptions of circular economies is the basic notion of maximising value and 
minimising waste by various means at the different stages of the creation-consumption 
process. This involves, inter alia, better use of raw materials, better product design, and more 
effective reuse and recycling of end-products. Reintegration processes are evident at all 
stages of the creation-consumption process. Thus products are designed so that they are more 
durable and when no longer usable can be easily recycled to avoid the generation of unusable 
waste. Manufacturing processes are altered so that waste that is produced at the 
manufacturing stage can be recycled (e.g. off-cuts of textiles being used to create further 
goods, rather than be disposed as trash). Waste at the end of its use-life is not exempt from 
this recycling (e.g. waste food to be used to generate energy through anaerobic digestion, 
rather than being sent to landfill). 
Of course, the broader picture is much more complex, with the potential for diffuse 
practices and transactions interacting with various degrees of success in attaining circular 
economic targets. This article will examine some current practices and interactions to 
ascertain some of the potential legal issues that may arise. Prior to the legal analysis, it is 
necessary to set out in depth the concept and structure of circular economy.  
The first point to note is one of nomenclature: there is no definition of circular 
economy, and one can easily talk of notions such as circular economic practices, circular 
economies, circular economic parties, circular transactions, and so on, in both discrete and 
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interrelated ways. Use of such terms will vary for stylistic rather than any formal reasons. 
This article will not follow a rigid taxonomy here; moreover, a rigid taxonomy would likely 
present an inappropriately static representation of systems, which as will be seen, are highly 
dynamic and fluid in shape. Whilst there may well be a need for a new nomenclature for 
participants and activities within a circular economy, this article will not be engaging in such 
a taxonomic process.  
It is suggested though that the terms “seller” and “buyer” will be too restrictive, and 
will fail to capture a broader range of transactions that will be valuable within circular 
economies. Instead, the following terms will be used. The “initiator” is the party that 
introduces materials into the circular economy for the first time. This should not be taken as 
an absolute and exclusive category: “new” manufactured goods are likely to include even 
minute amounts of recycled material. The “receptor” is the party who receives goods from an 
initiator. There may well be multiple receptors from a single initiator, and receptors may be 
commercial entities for whom the aim is to dispose of the goods, either to another receptor 
for re-transmission, or to a receptor for the purpose of use (this may be a commercial or non-
commercial party). At the end of the useful life-span of the goods, they will be disposed of; 
the party at this point in the chain thus acts as a “disposer”. The disposal of the goods leaves 
them open for “acquirers”: parties who obtain goods that have been disposed of. Through 
further transactions the goods will either be injected back into the circular economy (the 
acquirer acting as a receptor, or as initiator), or they will be disposed of as waste. These four 
character-types, initiator, receptor, disposer, acquirer, encompass the range of behaviours 
found in circular economic structures more accurately (and less rigidly) than terms such as 
“buyer” and “seller”.  
What follows is an outline of the background to the modern concept of the circular 
economy, which itself precedes a more detailed analysis of recent developments. This 
provides the theoretical and ideological structure, as well as indicating certain practical 
applications and issues, which in turn raises questions about the legal implications. 
2.1 ANTECEDENTS 
The notion of a circular economy has academic antecedents across a broad range of 
disciplines. Stahel, an architect, has been instrumental for over thirty years in the field of 
sustainability. Much of his work concerns the capacity of circular economies to occur,1 
especially by means of closing up loops in current economic systems.2 More recently, he has 
expanded on the notion and discussed performance economies in a special issue of Nature.3 
At the heart of his analysis is the need to shift from ownership to use, and to consider use and 
performance as the dominant characteristics of goods within circular economies:  
 
Circular-economy business models fall in two groups: those that foster reuse and 
extend service life through repair, remanufacture, upgrades and retrofits; and those 
that turn old goods into as-new resources by recycling the materials. People — of all 
ages and skills — are central to the model. Ownership gives way to stewardship; 
consumers become users and creators. The remanufacturing and repair of old goods, 
                                                 
1 W. R. Stahel, “The Product-Life Factor” (1982), at http://www.product-life.org/en/major-publications/the-
product-life-factor. [All URLS accessed November 22, 2017.] 
2 W. R. Stahel and G. Reday-Mulvey, Jobs for Tomorrow: The Potential for Substituting Manpower for Energy 
(1981).  
3 W. R. Stahel, “The Circular Economy” at https://www.nature.com/news/the-circular-economy-1.19594 (March 
23, 2016). 
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buildings and infrastructure creates skilled jobs in local workshops. The experiences 
of workers from the past are instrumental. 
 
… 
 
A performance economy goes a step further by selling goods (or molecules) as 
services through rent, lease and share business models. The manufacturer retains 
ownership of the product and its embodied resources and thus carries the 
responsibility for the costs of risks and waste. In addition to design and reuse, the 
performance economy focuses on solutions instead of products, and makes its profits 
from sufficiency, such as waste prevention.4 
 
For the purposes of this article, it will be taken that the performance economy will function as 
a performative element within circular economic processes. What should be remembered 
though is the important policy undergirding circular economies: the shift from ownership to 
use as dominant factors in dispositions and transactions involving goods. 
In addition to Stahel, other scholars have contributed substantially to circular economic 
thought, covering issues such as the analogy between industrial and biological ecosystems,5 
the impact of socio-economics,6 and the limitations and wastefulness of the reduce-reuse-
recycle approach to waste and the need for greater intensity in cycling of products.7 At a 
symposium on ‘Creativity within the Circular Economy’ in 2016,8 Jules Hayward of the Ellen 
MacArthur Foundation noted that the current approach to circular economic thought is a 
synthesis of existing work,9 covering the performance economy (Stahel), cradle to cradle,10 
natural capitalism,11 industrial ecology and symbiosis,12 and biomimicry.13  
The idea of circular economy is thus a conglomeration of ideas from a wide range of 
disciplinary backgrounds. The important role of environmental protection as a driver for the 
various foundational works needs acknowledgement. However, the legal consequences of 
moves to circular economy, the questions that might arise dealing with new forms of 
relationships and new socio-economic practices, appear to have received only very limited 
consideration. This gap in the literature has continued despite a recent explosion of interest in 
the synthetic ideal of circular economic thought. This has become problematic in light of 
growing commercial interest in the opportunities afforded by circular economic practices. 
                                                 
4 https://www.nature.com/news/the-circular-economy-1.19594 (March 23, 2016). 
5 R. Frosch and N. Gallopoulos, “Strategies for Manufacturing” (1989) 261 Scientific American 94. 
6 M. Fischer-Kowalski and W. Hüttler, “Society’s metabolism: The intellectual history of materials flow 
analysis, part II: 1970-1998” (1998) 2 Journal of Industrial Ecology 107. 
7 W. McDonough and M. Braungart, Cradle to cradle: remaking the way we make things, (2002), (London: 
Vintage Press, 2009). 
8 The Westminster Law and Theory Lab, University of Westminster, 24 March 2016. 
9 See generally http://www.circulareconomy.com/circular-economy/schools-of-thought/.  
10 Above fn. 7. 
11 P. Hawkin, A. Lovins and L. H. Lovins, Natural Capitalism: Creating the next industrial revolution, (Boston: 
Little Brown & Co, 1999). 
12 M. R. Chertow, “Industrial Symbiosis: Literature and Taxonomy” (2000) 25 Annual Review of Energy and the 
Environment 313. 
13 https://biomimicry.org/. 
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2.2 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Recently circular economy has been garnering support from think tanks,14 and perhaps most 
importantly, has obtained the considerable support of the Ellen MacArthur Foundation.15 The 
Ellen MacArthur Foundation has itself obtained significant interest group support,16 and has 
been able to produce a large volume of explanatory literature about the concept, and its 
application in the real world. In addition, circular economic thought has been taken up by 
domestic, regional and international governmental and institutional organs;17 the EU’s 
Horizon 2020 Work Programme from 2018 to 2020 aims to fund projects concerning circular 
economy to the tune of €941 million.18 These efforts have also found considerable support 
from corporate interests,19 as well as charitable organisations.20 Academic interest has also 
accelerated.21 These efforts often complement and refer to each other,22 and exemplify the 
importance to circular economic thought of the value of reintegrating waste back into the 
economy at any and all stages of creation-consumption processes.  
Various different formulations of what circular economy means can be gleaned from 
the literature. At the Creativity within the Circular Economy symposium, Hayward suggested 
there were three principles at the heart of circular economic thought: (1) preservation and 
enhancement of natural capital; (2) optimisation of resource yields; and (3) fostering system 
effectiveness by revealing and designing out negative externalities.23 That explanation, and 
this article, focuses on material objects. Intangible things, such as digital products, are not 
subject to the same sort of deterioration resulting from usage and can potentially exist 
forever. Unfortunately, detailed analysis is outside the scope of this article, but their 
importance has been acknowledged by the Ellen MacArthur Foundation.24  
                                                 
14 F. Preston, “A Global Redesign? Shaping the Circular Economy”, Chatham House Briefing Paper (March 1, 
2012), at https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/182376. 
15 Ellen MacArthur Foundation, Towards the Circular Economy: Economic and business rationale for an 
accelerated transition, (2013), at 
http://www.ellenmacarthurfoundation.org/assets/downloads/publications/Ellen-MacArthur-Foundation-
Towards-the-Circular-Economy-vol.1.pdf.    
16 https://www.ellenmacarthurfoundation.org/about/partners. 
17 See e.g. Collaboration for a Circular Economy, Innovate UK, at 
https://connect.innovateuk.org/web/collaborations-circular-economy/overview; Department for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs, UK response to European Commission consultation of member states on the circular 
economy, (November 11, 2015), at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/circular-economy-and-waste-
markets-uk-government-response-to-european-commission-consultations); 
https://www.epsrc.ac.uk/funding/calls/circulareconomy/ (December 2015). 
18 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-4123_en.htm (October 27, 2017). 
19 See e.g. http://www.coara.co.uk/definitive-guide-circular-economy-businesses/ (a commercial asset recycling 
business); http://www.veolia.co.uk/circulareconomy (a waste management business); G Hieminga, Rethinking 
finance in a circular economy: Financial implications of circular business models (May 2015) (at 
http://www.ing.com/About-us/Ourstories/Features/Circular-economy-challenges-financial-business-
models.htm); Chartered Institute of Wastes Management, The Circular Economy: what does it mean for the 
waste and resource management sector?, (October 2014), at http://www.ciwm-
journal.co.uk/downloads/CIWM_Circular_Economy_Report-FULL_FINAL_Oct_2014.pdf.    
20 http://www.wrap.org.uk/content/wrap-and-circular-economy. 
21 See e.g. Call for Papers for a special issue of the Journal of Industrial Ecology on “Exploring the Circular 
Economy”: http://jie.yale.edu/jie-cfp-circular_econ; https://www.ukela.org/circular-economy (special interest 
group of the UK Environmental Law Association); http://www.greatrecovery.org.uk/resources/what-is-the-
great-recovery/; https://www.cranfield.ac.uk/courses/taught/technology-innovation-and-management-for-a-
circular-economy. 
22 See e.g. DEFRA, above fn. 17, 8. 
23 Above fn. 8. 
24 Ellen MacArthur Foundation, Intelligent Assets: Unlocking the circular economy potential, (February 8, 
2016), at http://www.ellenmacarthurfoundation.org/publications. The recent report on a new digital industrial 
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The charity Waste and Resources Action Programme (‘WRAP’) provides a useful 
overview of its perspective on circular economy: ‘A circular economy is an alternative to a 
traditional linear economy (make, use, dispose) in which we keep resources in use for as long 
as possible, extract the maximum value from them whilst in use, then recover and regenerate 
products and materials at the end of each service life.’25 They set out a number of benefits of 
circular economy: ‘As well as creating new opportunities for growth, a more circular 
economy will: reduce waste; drive greater resource productivity; deliver a more competitive 
UK economy; position the UK to better address emerging resource security/scarcity issues in 
the future; help reduce the environmental impacts of our production and consumption in both 
the UK and abroad.’26  
WRAP exemplify the circular economy diagrammatically in the form of a circle, with 
the connecting sectors being: Design/manufacture  Retailer  
Consumer/householder/local authorities  Re-use/repair/recycling  Recycling sector  
Design/manufacture. This Ouroboros relationship is a continually connected circle, with no 
specified start or end point. This is of course a conceptual representation. One of the 
mentioned sectors, re-use/repair/recycling, is more of a stage for processes to be undertaken 
following use, whilst the others are sectors properly understood and will involve commercial 
actors. It could also be suggested that one of the sectors can reasonably be considered the 
starting point: Design/manufacture (at least in the framework used by WRAP). Things will 
have to at some stage be created from primary materials; whilst some component materials 
may well be recycled and thus should not be considered “new” this will not be the sole type. 
The idealistic situation will be that there is functionally no substantive injection of new 
materials constituting a definitive starting point, but this is of course unlikely to be the case at 
any point soon.27 
Furthermore, there will be multilateral interconnections between the different stages. 
Retailers may engage directly with the recycling sector, without transacting with the 
consumer sector, and consumers may become manufacturers.28 Each connection from one 
stage to another is likely to be a delta, with each channel concerning a different aspect of the 
overall transaction: the transfer of title or property in the goods; the transfer of use-rights, or 
other authorizations; the transfer of obligations, to the transferor and to other parties who 
entered the circle at earlier stages (thus making the elements of the circular economy 
multidirectional). These transfers may or may not be interconnected, or operate in a parallel 
or serial process. This is conceptualized as “cascade” thinking by the Ellen MacArthur 
Foundation: ‘the essence of value creation lies in the opportunity to extra additional value 
from products and materials by cascading them through other applications’. They give the 
example that going ‘from tree to furnace’ misses out the opportunity of cascading the value 
of the tree, through ‘successive uses as timber and timber products before decay and eventual 
incineration.’29 This article will examine this aspect through the lens of property’s capturing 
mechanisms for goods at the edges of consumption. Cascades of use-value fall alongside 
cascades of other incidents of ownership and aspects of proprietary rights and interests, by 
virtue of the current dominant property regime. These cascades may fall in different 
                                                                                                                                                        
strategy (http://industrialdigitalisation.org.uk/project/) contains only the faintest of references to circular 
economy: Made Smarter Review 2017, at http://industrialdigitalisation.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2017/10/Made-Smarter-Review-Final-Report-2017.pdf 45, 61, 85, 103, 166. 
25 http://www.wrap.org.uk/about-us/about/wrap-and-circular-economy.  
26 ibid. 
27 See e.g. A. Zaman and S. Lehman, ‘The Zero Waste Index: A Performance Measurement Tool for Waste 
Management Systems in a “Zero Waste City” (2013) 50 Journal of Cleaner Production 123. 
28 The so-called “prosumer”: see e.g. I. Brown and C. Marsden, ‘Regulating Code: Towards Prosumer Law?’ 
(February 25, 2013), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2224263.  
29 https://www.ellenmacarthurfoundation.org/circular-economy/overview/characteristics. 
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directions, at different speeds, and to different stages. One party may have a possessory right 
enabling them to use the goods, a previous party an access right to acquire the goods in the 
first place, a third party an interest in the exchange-value of the goods, and so on. The 
dynamism of the property regime’s cascading is such that it reaches to the end of chains of 
transactions, to the points at which goods are on the edge of use-value.  
However, the inevitable friction of movement through the circular economy will lead to 
unavoidable and un-reclaimable loss of materials. What waste is produced may not be 
subjected to successful reintegration, depending on what sector or transactional stage they 
inhabit or apply to. Such processes will vary dramatically according to the complexity of the 
objects concerned. There will necessarily be occasions where a potential reintegration fails 
and material is lost from a circular transaction. This article focuses closely on the possible 
treatment for such losses that English personal property law can provide, be it prophylactic or 
preventative. 
There is thus a chaotic mix of variable events, processes, and relationships, all aiming 
to achieve a broad, laudable but unspecific goal. One of the consequences of this is perhaps 
unsurprising, if not necessarily effective: a regulatory turn by governmental organisations. It 
is suggested that such developments are more about lofty aims than concrete policies. One of 
the earliest instances of a regulatory turn to circular economy can be found in the Circular 
Economy Promotion Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated August 2008; in 
force January 2009).30 It defined a ‘circular economy’ as ‘a generic term for the reducing, 
reusing and recycling activities conducted in the process of production, circulation and 
consumption.’31 This will ‘be propelled by the government, led by the market, effected by 
enterprises and participated in by the public’,32 as illustrated by the preference for circular 
business practices in public procurement,33 and provisions obliging producers to recycle 
certain named products even if the material is ‘deserted’ (abandoned).34 Although this Law is 
‘largely exhortatory and contains few enforceable provisions’,35 and is unlikely to affect the 
significant role of informal waste collection without corresponding effective social change,36 
the focus on controlling waste is important. 
A heavy focus on waste is also found in the EU’s circular economy strategy,37 which is 
probably a reflection of the rather tortured history of waste management in the EU.38 The 
EU’s Action Plan aimed to ‘close the loop’, and reduce waste sent to landfill,39 but not 
without reference to the need to engage producers to design and manufacture in circle-
                                                 
30 For a translation, see e.g. http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=7025&lib=law. See also G. Chen 
and B. F. C. Hsu, “Law and Policy in the Sustainability of Affordable Housing: The Case of China” (2012-13) 
30 U.C.L.A. Pacific Basin Law Journal 259, 284-286. 
31 Circular Economy Promotion Law, Article 2. 
32 ibid., Article 3.  
33 ibid., Article 47. 
34 ibid., Article 15. 
35 E. Ryan, “The Elaborate Paper Tiger: Environmental Enforcement and the Rule of Law in China” (2014) 24 
Duke Environmental Law and Policy Forum 183, 189-190. 
36 R. Linzer and S. Salhofer, “Municipal solid waste recycling and the significance of informal sector in urban 
China” (2014) 32 Waste Management and Research 896; B. Gillin, “Keeping Up with Chinese Consumerism: 
Offsetting China’s Individually Generated Garbage with Regulatory and Social Mechanisms” (2011-12) 13 
Vermont Journal of Environmental Law 69. 
37 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/circular-economy/index_en.htm.  
38 See e.g. D. Moore, “Commission Pledges Tough Circular Economy Package Enforcement” (April 6, 2016), at 
http://www.ciwm-journal.co.uk/commission-pledges-tough-enforcement-circular-economy-package/. 
39 EC, Closing the loop - An EU action plan for the Circular Economy (COM (2015) 614). See further e.g. Y. 
M. Gordeeva, “Recent Developments in EU Environmental Policy and Legislation” (2016) 13 Journal of 
European Environmental & Planning Law 120, 120-121. 
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appropriate ways.40 Two years later, at the start of 2017, the Commission released a report on 
the implementation of the Action Plan.41 This report identified a number of areas where 
legislative proposals had been made, covering a wide range of activities involving primary 
resources, waste-reuse and recycling, through to financing circular economic practices.42 
Many of the proposals are of considerable socio-economic and techno-environmental benefit, 
and if implemented effectively will be valuable in the move towards circular economy. 
However, some of the proposals are questionable: the argument that improving guarantees for 
consumers in online sales of goods will improve the quality of goods and thus prevent 
‘products from being thrown away’ raises questions as to whether the enhancement of a 
remedy of repair is necessary.43 That such proposals for consumer transactions will do little if 
anything for non-consumer sales, or that consumer practices towards wasting and transacting 
in second-hand goods appear quite contradictory and not like those assumptions at the heart 
of the Action Plan,44 appear almost irrelevant. The Plan also tends towards assuming that 
commerce and consumption exists solely within the EU’s boundaries, and is solely 
undertaken by participants within the EU, somewhat problematic in light of the irrelevance of 
jurisdiction to circular economic thinking.45 There are also the inevitably complex questions 
raised by Brexit about the continuing relevance of the EU’s approach in the UK. Given this 
article’s focus on the implications for English rather than EU law, and acknowledging the 
inevitable repatriation of environmental policy post-Brexit, specific analysis of the EU’s 
Action Plan will not be undertaken herein. 
The UK’s response to the EU’s 2015 Action Plan, through the Department of 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA),46  was favourable to the circular economic 
concept, though subject to a light-touch regulatory approach. The aims included a reduction 
in obligations to reuse/recycle waste for SMEs and other such groups,47 as well as increasing 
data capture, usage and sharing across the single market (for design and waste aspects) to 
more effectively create and maintain circular business.48 The potential contribution of public 
procurement was also recognised.49 Whilst DEFRA made very brief reference to 
‘support[ing] trade in second hand products’,50 it appeared content to refer to work 
undertaken by Hieminga’s report for the ING banking group as to issues concerning property 
and ownership in circular economic practice,51 discussed below. 
                                                 
40 EC, Closing the loop - An EU action plan for the Circular Economy: Annex I (COM (2015) 614) (listing the 
various ways in which the EU plans to achieve its aims). 
41 EC, Report from the Commission … on the implementation of the Circular Economy Action Plan (COM 
(2017) 33 final.  
42 See e.g. C Backes, Law for a Circular Economy, (The Hague: Eleven International Publishing 2017), 
available at https://www.uu.nl/sites/default/files/rgl-ucowsl-backes-law_for_a_circular_economy.pdf, and 
discussed in detail below (text following fn. 64). 
43 Ibid., 3. 
44 See e.g. M. O’Brien, A Crisis of Waste? Understanding the Rubbish Society (Abingdon: Routledge 2007); N. 
Gregson and L. Crewe, Second Hand Cultures (Oxford: Berg 2003); W. Rathje and C. Murphy, Rubbish! The 
Archaeology of Garbage (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, [1992] 2001). 
45 See text following fn. 58. 
46 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/circular-economy-and-waste-markets-uk-government-response-
to-european-commission-consultations.  
47 DEFRA, above fn. 17, 3. 
48 DEFRA, UK response to European Commission consultation of member states on the circular economy 
(October 2015), at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/475862/circ-
economy-eu-consult-uk-response.pdf. 
49 DEFRA, above fn. 17, 2-3. This de-regulatory approach also appears to be taken in the Netherlands: Backes, 
above fn. 42, 20. 
50 ibid., 16. 
51 DEFRA, above fn. 48, 8.   
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At the time of writing (Autumn 2017), the consequences of Brexit for this issue are 
unclear. There does not appear to have been a response to the 2017 Report from the UK 
government. The very recent Clean Growth Strategy published by the Department for 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy only refers to circular economy in passing, and with 
no mention of the EU.52 More specifically, Backes has noted that EU regulation for recycling 
construction and demolition wastes ‘will [for the UK] obviously become less relevant’,53 but 
he does not go into further detail (unsurprisingly so, given his focus), other than to note that 
increasing EU targets will for the UK, along with the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany, be 
‘at best, irrelevant’ due to already superior recycling rates.54 This directs us to a possible 
analysis of Brexit here: it may not make much of a difference in light of current commercial 
practices vis-à-vis waste. Brexit may however provide the opportunity for backsliding in the 
UK: without formal EU regulatory frameworks, then such recycling rates that currently occur 
(across all sectors, not just construction and demolition) may fall. However, there may be 
retention of current EU law (either completely or with very minor changes), or it may be that 
even in the event of substantial alteration or complete overhaul of the current regulatory 
framework, the fact that current commercial practices may be in excess of current legal 
requirements (at least in some areas, though admittedly this is not the case in all) might 
indicated that there would be little commercial justification for any backsliding regardless of 
the opportunities presented. Indeed, continuation of the EU framework post-Brexit may well 
have commercial viability in terms of potentially allowing for continuing cross-border (ie 
UK-EU27) trade and dealings in waste. Naturally these two directions are the extremes; the 
possibility of some middle ground being reached could also be contemplated. Unfortunately, 
the lack of clarity in terms of the current exit negotiations, and the unpredictability of future 
agreements at this stage, prevents anything other than the most speculative ambiguity at this 
point. Predicting such an outcome is beyond the scope of this article though.  
Returning to the broader issues, it is suggested that the content of the regulatory turns 
seen at national and regional level, along with increased commercial interest, reveals a 
duality at the heart of circular economic thought: on one hand it is presented as an 
opportunity for dealing with production and waste in a more efficient manner in terms of 
environmental costs; on the other hand it is presented as being a commercially-focused 
ideology enabling profit opportunities to be developed in an integrated and interconnected 
world of high-technology enabling efficient diffusion of ownership and use rights between 
relevant parties in chains of transactions. It is this latter aspect which is of greatest interest. 
For all of the claims and targets on improving recycling rates and helping consumers to avoid 
wasting (disregarding the actual evidence on such matters), circular economic thought is far 
more profound: it will involve ‘nothing short of a wholesale transformation of the basis of 
contemporary capitalism and consumption’.55 
Surprisingly, there has not been much substantive legal analysis even following the 
regulatory turn.56 This becomes problematic when the size and complexity of circular 
                                                 
52 Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, The Clean Growth Strategy: Leading the way to a 
low carbon future (October 2017), at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/651916/BEIS_The_Clean_Growt
h_online_12.10.17.pdf, 105 n 273; 135 (noting that DEFRA is working with the OECD on circular economy, to 
report at the end of 2018).  
53 Backes, above fn. 42, 48 n 76. 
54 Backes, above fn. 42, 48. 
55 Gregson et. al., above fn. 58, 224, citing B. Su, A. Heshmati, Y. Geng, & X. Yu, “A review of the circular 
economy in China: Moving from rhetoric to implementation” (2013) 42 Journal of Cleaner Production 215, 
217. 
56 Some rare examples are C. Dalhammar, “The Application of “Life Cycle Thinking” in European 
Environmental Law: Theory and Practice” (2015) 12 Journal of European Environmental & Planning Law 97; 
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economies necessitates an immense regulatory effort,57 let alone the transformation of 
contemporary commerce it entails. This aspect has recently been subject to powerful criticism 
by Gregson, Crang, Fuller and Holmes.58 They argue that the EU’s approach fails to account 
for the global context and remains bloc-centred. This containment strategy rests on a 
normative perception of global waste recovery networks as dirty, illegal trades in waste: 
circular economies are ‘distinctly moral economies in which there are right and wrong ways 
to achieve resource recovery, even within the EU’s boundaries’.59 The EU-centric approach 
focuses on industrial symbiosis and extended product life, ‘both producer-led’ concepts, 
which write out global waste recovery networks,60 and sets up ‘a form of mercantilism’ in the 
hope of creating ‘geo-political insurance … against the EU’s increasingly apparent resource 
insecurity.’61 Researchers across different disciplines have questioned the underlying moral 
superiority of circular economic thought as restricting ‘critical consideration’ in this 
context,62 This critique is effective and, even in light of the 2017 Report, remains broadly 
accurate. Something Gregson et al did not cover was the potential legal issues arising.63 Yet, 
engaging with the legal issues results in potentially unexpected possibilities. As will be seen, 
the English property regime fits reasonably well with the allegedly transformative circular 
economy ideal. Therefore, will transition to circular economies really be ‘politically 
contested’?64 
The political contests concerning moves to a circular economy, along with analysis of 
some of the legal aspects of such a shift, have recently been considered in an inaugural 
lecture by Chris Backes of Utrecht University.65 He considered circular economy through the 
lens of Dutch environmental law (and thus by necessity also through an EU lens), and paid 
specific attention to a number of issues not covered here (for reasons of economy); it is 
worthwhile though briefly outlining what appears (so far) to be one of the first English 
language legal examinations of circular economy.66 Backes concentrated on whether circular 
                                                                                                                                                        
T. J. de Römph, ‘Terminological Challenges to the Incorporation of Landfill Mining in EU Waste Law in View 
of the Circular Economy’ (2016) 25 European Energy and Environmental Law Review 106; K. Steenmans, J. 
Marriott and R. Malcolm, ‘Commodification of Waste: Legal and Theoretical Approaches to Industrial 
Symbiosis as part of a Circular Economy’ (June 9,  2017) Working paper presented at the SMART conference 
‘Life-cycle based management and reporting for sustainable business’, November 29-30, 2016; University of 
Oslo Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series No 2017-26; available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2983631. It appears that there is a forthcoming collection of essays on this broad topic: 
E. Maitre-Ekern, C. Dalhammar and H. C. Bugge (eds), Preventing Environmental Damage from Products: An 
Analysis of the Policy and Regulatory Framework in Europe (Cambridge: CUP, forthcoming 2018). 
57 F. Bonciu, “The European Economy: From a Linear to a Circular Economy” (2014) 14 Romanian Journal of 
European Affairs 78, 86.  
58 N. Gregson, M. Crang, S. Fuller & H. Holmes, “Interrogating the circular economy: the moral economy of 
resources recovery in the EU” (2015) 44 Economy and Society 218. 
59 ibid., 227. 
60 ibid., 221. See further e.g. A. Mckenna, “Computer Waste: A Forgotten and Hidden Side to the Global 
Information Society” (2007) 9 Environmental Law Review 116; L. K. Breggin and J. Pendergrass, “Addressing 
Nanotechnology Waste and Product Disposal: Can the Superfund Safety Net Catch Tiny Particles?” (2007) 19 
Journal of Environmental Law 323. This is in contrast to claims that waste law might exist to ‘stimulate and 
guarantee a high level of circular use of materials’: Backes, above fn. 42, 26. 
61 Gregson et. al., above fn. 58, 236. 
62 T. Ferrando, “Impolite Conversations around the “War on Waste”” Critical Legal Thinking: Law and the 
Political, April 8, 2016, at http://criticallegalthinking.com/2016/04/08/impolite-conversations-around-war-
waste/; Gregson et. al., above fn. 58. 
63 They are not lawyers, so no criticism at all is intended here. 
64 ibid., 225 (nb referring to EU, rather than the UK, in terms of this contestation, but the underlying issue 
remains the same). 
65 Backes, above fn. 42. 
66 In the course of his lecture Backes appears to refer to a small number of Dutch analyses of circular economy, 
covering implications for competition law (A. Gerbrandy, “Circulaire economie en de grondslagen van het 
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economy will lead to the elimination of waste law, on the grounds circular economy will not 
produce waste – at least, as far as waste is currently defined in the EU framework. He 
suggests a shift in mentality will be required to deal with the transformation of waste from 
rubbish to commercial products. Additionally he examines the extent to which regulatory 
frameworks will need to be altered in order to provide a more flexible and responsive legal 
environment for development and implementation of innovation vis-à-vis circular economy 
priorities (such as the need to effectively respond to new technologies which might actually 
infringe current prohibitions on dealing with waste). Linking in with this is his argument that 
changes may be required to public procurement rules and practices, both as a way of fostering 
innovation and as a way of embedding circular economy per se. Altogether Backes set out an 
ambitious set of issues that need addressing, as well as providing some interesting reform 
suggestions to move towards legislative realisation of circular economy. Backes’ focus on 
EU law issues does however result in a substantial gap, concerning English law, which this 
article aims to fill. Prior to that task, it is worth making some brief critical points about 
Backes’ argument. 
At the outset, he claims ‘one thing is clear: we have to change our habits and our way 
of working, consuming and living’.67 Two points can be made here: (i) there are problems 
with a simplistic charge against consumption practices, and (ii) if there is to be change, who 
exactly will benefit? As to (i), contrary to common perceptions, ordinary people’s 
consumption practices are neither particularly wasteful compare to previous generations, nor 
are they indicative of a negative culture of overconsumption. Quite simply, there may not 
actually be a waste crisis.68 As to (ii), it is suggested that the changes (or shifts) to circular 
economy may best be described as really benefiting corporate commercial interests; 
environmental and consumer benefits may be limited and inadvertent at best. It is recognised 
that Backes made his point in the context of a need to reduce use of primary resources, and in 
that context his argument has strength.69 In terms of his analysis regarding innovation, he 
provides much food for thought. However, it should be noted that innovation can come in 
many guises. It may be that innovate may occur in situations outside of regulatory 
frameworks of the sort Backes analyses, such as in commercial structures. This is the case in 
terms of the alterations to ownership and use structures considered in depth below. 
Furthermore, it must also be noted that current institutional frameworks (of legal doctrine 
and/or commercial practice) may suffice for those non-innovative methods currently used and 
likely to be continually used in addition to any novel or radical methods, systems and 
practices that technological and other developments may lead to. Thus how circular economy 
fits within current institutional frameworks and commercial practices remains a valid topic 
for analysis. Thus whilst Backes is correct in saying that the ‘legal framework is only one 
element needed to foster innovation’,70 such a statement does not tell the full story. 
In the following section a variety of potential legal implications will be considered. 
These will provide something more specific that what has been provided by the various 
regulatory efforts noted above, but many will remain in this article merely as pointers for 
further research. What will first be considered is the relationship between sharing economies 
and circular economies. It will be shown that the most appropriate way forward is to 
acknowledge the subsidiary nature of sharing economies: they are neither necessary nor 
                                                                                                                                                        
mededingings-recht”, in Verenging voor milieurecht, Met recht naar en circulaire economie (VMR 2017/1, 
Boom juridisch, Den Haag 2017), cited at Backes, above fn. 42, 16 n. 19) and waste law generally (ibid, at 27 n. 
36) (CCC). Not having Dutch, I am unable to consider these sources. 
67 Backes, above fn. 42, 10. 
68 See e.g. O’Brien, above fn. 44. 
69 Cf. Backes, above fn. 42, 13-16. 
70 Backes, above fn. 42, 32. 
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sufficient, but they are not exclusive to circular economic structures. Some features are 
common to both systems, and the (more extensive) literature on sharing economy indicates a 
number of potential problems that might afflict circular economies. The second sub-section 
will consider the implications of treatments of ownership and use, with a specific focus on the 
extent legal regimes for the treatment of waste might need reform or refocusing to deal with 
waste in circular economies. 
3. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF CIRCULAR ECONOMY 
The specific legal implications of circular economy have been subjected to very limited 
analysis. This sub-section addresses this lacuna by indicating a number of areas of private 
law where there may be potential for rupture or renovation when applied to circular 
economies.71 
With a circular economy requiring greater levels of cooperation at all stages in the 
creation-consumption process, there may be possible implications in terms of competition 
law,72 corporate law,73 and public procurement.74 As alluded to above,75 the implications for 
intellectual property will likely be considerable. There will also be a clear need for 
considerable ingenuity in formulating appropriate regulatory frameworks for the manufacture 
of circular-economy appropriate products.76 Transportation of goods might not need radical 
analysis, not least in light of the potential value of the Rotterdam rules and its concomitant 
transportation document regime,77 but no doubt there will be aspects which will be 
problematic. 
Long-term contractual relationships, a subject of much debate,78 will need to be catered 
for. On one hand circular economies will require easy mechanisms to engage in long-term 
agreements with binding effect. This cannot simply arrive with the entry of participants in 
circular economies. Whatever practices circular economy actors are currently doing are likely 
to be inappropriate in the context of increasing commercial complexity, as compared to more 
formalised rules.79 On the other hand, the capacity of legal systems to allow for relational 
contracting can be questioned. Similarly, claims as to the possible value of conceptualising 
long term connected contracts as networks, based on systems analysis theory, is also a 
                                                 
71 This is definitely not to say that public law would be irrelevant, and the privacy concerns alone with circular 
economic structures are likely to be immense. 
72 Noted at e.g. DEFRA, above fn. 48, 10, 16. 
73 T. Clarke, “The Widening Scope of Directors’ Duties: The Increasing Impact of Corporate Social and 
Environmental Responsibility” (2015-16) 39 Seattle University Law Review 531, 548; 578. See also B. Sjåfjell, 
‘Redefining Agency Theory to Internalize Environmental Product Externalities. A Tentative Proposal Based on 
Life-Cycle Thinking’, in Preventing Environmental Damage from Products: An Analysis of the Policy and 
Regulatory Framework in Europe, eds. E. Maitre-Ekern, C. Dalhammar and H. C. Bugge (eds) (Cambridge: 
CUP, forthcoming 2018). 
74 See e.g. Backes, above fn. 42, 54-60. 
75 Above fn. 24. 
76 Bonciu, above fn. 57; Backes, above fn. 42. 
77 See e.g. E. Eftestøl-Wilhelmsson, “The Rotterdam Rules in a European multimodal context” (2016) 16 
Journal of Maritime Law 274. 
78 The literature is too vast to be cited in full, but see e.g. S. Macaulay, “Non-contractual relations in business: a 
preliminary study” (1963) 28 American Sociological Review 55; H. Collins, Regulating Contracts (Oxford: 
OUP, 1999); S. Macaulay, “The Real and the Paper Deal: Empirical Pictures of Relationships, Complexity and 
the Urge for Transparent Simple Rules” (2003) 66 M.L.R. 44; R. Austen-Baker, “Comprehensive Contract 
Theory: a Four-Norm Model of Contract Relations” (2009) 25 Journal of Contract Law 216; C. Mitchell, 
Contract Law and Contract Practice: Bridging the Gap between Legal Reasoning and Commercial Expectation 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013).  
79 See e.g. L. Bernstein, “Merchant Law in a Modern Economy”, in Philosophical Foundations of Contract 
Law, eds. G. Klass, G. Letsas and P. Saprai (Oxford: OUP, 2014) ch 13. 
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potential minefield.80 It should also be recognised that these long-term relationships will also 
at various different stages involve consumers, either connecting with commercial operators or 
potentially other consumers. The implications for consumer protection in light of the shift 
towards controlling use, the core of circular economic thought, will also need to be worked 
out.81  
There will no doubt of course be other areas of law that could be affected, to one degree 
or another, by circular economic practices and trends; others will no doubt provide more 
penetrating analyses. This article focuses on the relationship between the notions of sharing 
economy and circular economy, and the possible value to circular economy of English 
personal property rules. The sharing economy has been subject to a considerable volume of 
literature in recent years, and in its focus on use-values and the way forms of sharing can 
more effectively enable others to access and benefit from using assets bears some 
considerable similarity with the emphasis on use in circular economic thought. Nevertheless, 
it will be suggested that sharing economies are better understood as sub-sets of circular 
economies. Even so, the next sub-section will also draw out of the sharing economy literature 
some possible implications and issues for circular economics. Following will be an analysis 
of how waste could be conceptualised and dealt with using principles of English personal 
property law. 
3.1 SHARING ECONOMIES AND CIRCULAR ECONOMIES 
The potential of collaborative consumption and the sharing economy, which emphasises 
(paid-for) sharing and use,82 rather than individual ownership,83 has so far attracted more 
interest from legal scholars than the broader concept of a circular economy. Why these things 
should be so is not entirely clear. It raises intriguing questions about the way in which legal 
scholarship relates to macro-economic issues, as well as issues such as urbanism.84 One 
explanation for this might be that the sharing economy lends itself much more to legal 
scholars’ tendency (for good or for bad) towards taxonomic debate. Another explanation 
might be that sharing as an act, and the specific actions in the sharing economy such as those 
exemplified by Airbnb or Uber, are more amenable to specific legal analysis than the broader 
and more complex notions of circular economy, and there also been considerable scholarship 
                                                 
80 See e.g. D. Campbell, “Luhman without tears: complex economic regulation and the erosion of the market 
sphere” (2013) 33 L.S. 162. 
81 The literature is vast, but Radin’s critique is an excellent starting point: M. J. Radin, Boilerplate: the Fine 
Print, Vanishing Rights, and the Rule of Law (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2013). 
82 R. Belk, “You are what you can access: sharing and collaborative consumption online” (2014) 67 Journal of 
Business Research 1595, 1597. 
83 See generally R. Botsman and R. Rogers, What’s Mine is Yours: The Rise of Collaborative Consumption 
(Harper Collins, 2010); L. Gansky, The Mesh: Why the Future of Business is Sharing (London: Penguin, 2010); 
B. Buczynski, Sharing is Good: How to Save Money, Time and Resources through Collaborative Consumption 
(New Society Publishers, 2013); M. Möhlmann, “Collaborative consumption: determinants of satisfaction and 
the likelihood of using a sharing economy option again” (2015) 14 Journal of Consumer Behaviour 193. 
84 N. M. Davidon and J. J. Infranca, “The Sharing Economy as an Urban Phenomenon” (2016) 34 Yale Law & 
Policy Review 215. 
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on the regulatory implications of sharing.85 Alternatively, it may just be that the sharing 
aspect reveals aspects of how relationships occur, a prime target for legal analysis.86 
There does not appear to a consistent meaning underlying the sharing economy: it can 
involve aspects of co-production, co-distribution, and co-consumption, all aided by 
technological change (in particular digitalisation and reductions in logistical costs).87 
Certainly there will be similarity and overlap between the sharing economy and the circular 
economy: both concern more efficient (the term is used broadly) use of goods or services, and 
there is likely to be considerable legal debate over the nature, role, and regulation of services 
in the circular economy as much as there is in the context of the sharing economy.  
Where the circular economy goes further though is by focusing not just on use, but 
more specifically long-term down-chain control of goods, in order to minimise or eradicate 
waste as a result of such products coming to the end of their use-life. The sharing economy is 
likely to be focused on the consumer sector of a circular economy, with potential connection 
to the retail or design/manufacture sectors. This is because sharing is an act of use, and non-
use of goods will indicate (a) a failure of the sharing economy and inevitably (b) a disposition 
of such goods. Thus sharing economy thought provides only limited assistance in examining 
how to deal with waste products. The sharing economy is perhaps thus best considered a sub-
set (neither necessary nor sufficient) of a circular economy. 
Nevertheless, the problems adumbrated to by scholars from various legal disciplines 
should be a warning for circular economy enthusiasts. There could be questions of regulatory 
status, especially in the employment context. Issues concerning the identification of taxable 
assets or income, a problem with the Airbnb model of sharing housing spaces, may well 
cross-over into circular economies; trying to identify the appropriate target for asset taxation 
(should there be such type) would require hard policy choices to be made between the actual 
owner and the user in an economy where use dominates ownership. Goods may be sold via a 
sharing arrangement, between one seller and multiple sharers, or there may be a sale of a 
sharing right by a sharer. These situations might be susceptible to analysis utilising current 
doctrinal understanding of shared ownership rights. One issue likely requiring radical 
analyses will be the absence of a concept of estates for personal property. Being time-based 
interests in land, estates could provide a useful mechanism to structure various rights and 
interests over assets. Further analysis is clearly required as to the most appropriate way to 
structure use-rights over personal property within an economic system predicated on use 
rather than ownership. 
Within the literature on the sharing economy, the circular economy is barely 
mentioned; most often it is absent.88 Here though it is worth directly engaging with one 
                                                 
85 K. Zale, “When Everything is Small: The Regulatory Challenge of Scale in the Sharing Economy” (2016) 53 
San Diego Law Review 949; R. H. Brescia, “Regulating the Sharing Economy: New and Old Insights into an 
Oversight Regime for the Peer-to-Peer Economy” (2016) 95 Nebraska Law Review 87; S. R. Miller, “First 
Principles for Regulating the Sharing Economy” (2016) 53 Harvard Journal on Legislation 147; R. Dyal-
Chand, “Regulating Sharing: The Sharing Economy as an Alternative Capitalist System” (2015) 90 Tulane Law 
Review 241. 
86 K. Zale, “Sharing Property” (2016) 87 University of Colorado Law Review 501; B. Morgan and D. Kuch, 
“Radical Transactionalism: Legal Consciousness, Diverse Economies, and the Sharing Economy” (2015) 42 
Journal of Law and Society 556; M. Maese, “Rethinking Host and Guest Relations in the Advent of Airbnb and 
the Sharing Economy” (2015) 2 Texas A. & M. Journal of Property Law 481. 
87 O. Lobel, “The Law of the Platform” (2016) 101 Minnesota Law Review 87; C. Cauffman, “The 
Commission’s European Agenda for the Collaborative Economy - (Too) Platform and Service Provider 
Friendly?” (2016) 5 Journal of European Consumer and Market Law 235; J. Infranca, “Intermediary Institutions 
and the Sharing Economy” (2016) 90 Tulane Law Review Online 29. 
88 Cf EU Committee of the Regions, The Local and Regional Dimension of the Sharing Economy, (December 
2015) [18]: “The debate on the circular economy and the Digital Single Market could be some of the areas 
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article on the sharing economy to illustrate some contrasting conclusions. Morgan and Kuch 
recently argued that ‘[r]ecognizing and stressing the diversity of both economic life and 
forms of law opens up an understanding of “radical transactionalism”, where legal building 
blocks of property and capital can be reimagined and reconfigured, and mono-chromatic 
visions of the sharing economy given fresh colour.’89 For them, ‘explor[ing] concrete 
instances of community-based sustainability actions and sharing-economy initiatives in the 
contexts of the history and trajectory of particular local settings. … [allows exploration of] 
the ways in which cultural narratives about legality constrain and/or enable social action.’90 
Their examination of the sharing economy, and the practices evident therein, indicated 
‘experimentation with ownership and control’; the consequences of these experiments should 
not be ‘imbrication of law with financialization strategies’ but instead ‘shared access to 
ownership’.91 
 There is much in Morgan and Kuch’s work to commend it, not least in its conclusion 
that ‘[r]adical transactional lawyers’ are essential to shaping the regulatory shape and 
trajectory of sharing economies.92 One of the central difficulties recognised by circular 
economy advocates has been the need for effective regulation and governance in order to 
achieve their aims, and in this respect there is communality. However, this author cannot 
apply their analysis of sharing economies up to the circular economy. Neither can this author 
fully agree with the argument that moves to a circular economy will be contested.93 As 
circular economies necessitate a strategy of (re)capturing goods for recirculation back into a 
commercial process, English personal property law provides the tools for circular economies 
to implement such a strategy, and it is likely (in light of the preference for use over ownership 
as governing factors) that there will not be sharing of ownership. 
3.2 OWNERSHIP AND USE – THE CASE OF WASTE 
The implications on circular economies of current property regimes are curiously absent from 
the literature, even though property regimes, and the ownership structures they produce, 
could be a substantial block in circular economies. The sole exception to this lacuna appears 
to be the report by Hieminga of the ING bank: Rethinking finance in a circular economy: 
Financial implications of circular business models. He suggested that ‘the legal and financial 
systems that support the current business environment may not be very conducive to the new 
setting that the circular economy requires.’94 He argued for a shift from ownership to access 
and use as conceptual bases more conducive to circular economy.95 This is in accordance 
with Stahel and the Ellen MacArthur Foundation, which had already argued for a shift from 
acquisition for consumption to acquisition for use, by means of a transformation of 
acquisitive transactions from transfers of ownership by sale to transfer of use rights by 
leases.96 Yet, as Hieminga noted, this shift may pose problems for asset financing.97 More 
                                                                                                                                                        
where the [sharing economy] should be taken into consideration.” This is the only mention of the circular 
economy in that document. 
89 Morgan and Kuch, above fn. 86, 586. 
90 ibid. 
91 ibid., 586-87. 
92 ibid., 587. 
93 Above fn. 64. 
94 Hieminga, above fn. 19, 35. 
95 ibid., 6. 
96 Ellen MacArthur Foundation, above fn. 15, 7. 
97 Hieminga, above fn. 19, 39. 
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generally, shifting from ownership to leasing for Gregson et al requires ‘nothing short of a 
wholesale transformation of the basis of contemporary capitalism and consumption’.98 
This shift from ownership to use requires an “ownership-heavy” approach, with the 
weight of ownership resting on just one participant in the circular economy. Hieminga 
illustrates this with the example of how Van Scherpenzeel, a Dutch recycling company, owns 
the materials throughout the supply chain (from collection of waste until reused).99 
Underlying this approach though is an apparent preference for dealing with ownership and 
accession issues through contract.100 Yet there are profound difficulties in simply resting 
property and ownership claims and rights on contract, and this is likely to increase in an era 
of new commercial and consumption practices. This has recently been demonstrated with the 
decisions of the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court on retention of title clauses, which has 
the general result that transactions on retention of title terms may not be sales, for the 
purposes of the Sale of Goods Act 1979.101 Instead, such agreements are a type of sui generis 
contract. Utilising such a doctrinal approach would be useful in the illustration above. The 
goods can be transacted with and transmitted around a circular economy whilst the title is 
retained by the initiating party in the transactions. This immediately focuses the parties 
attention as to the content of the contracts, which will set out the powers the parties have vis-
à-vis the objects of the transactions. Directions and limitations as to the use of the goods will 
be issued by the initiator in this process, which will restrict or enforce the activity that the 
receptor can undertake.  
Whilst Hieminga focused on acquisition, there are also problems at the other end of 
the spectrum, with waste: ‘the circular economy is based on the principle that waste does not 
exist and is a valuable resource in (perhaps another company’s) production. But the circular 
economy faces a lot of legal barriers that limit the use of waste as an input.’102 It will be 
shown that some of these problems concern the approach taken, at least in the EU, to waste. 
Another problem was alluded to by Dalhammar: ‘it is unreasonable to put the responsibility 
for collection and recycling on the producers, as is the case today. They have no ownership of 
the products when they become waste, as the consumers have possession of the products, and 
can therefore not guarantee that consumers turn them in for collection.’103 In a footnote to 
that text, Dalhammar added: ‘Even in a case where producers would – in the legal sense – 
keep ownership over sold products, the actual control over the products would be difficult to 
ensure.’104 Since it was suggested above that control would be possible, through utilisation of 
a contractual diffusion among parties of rights and obligations, it becomes necessary to 
examine further extent to which waste can be controlled. There is also a practical need for 
resolution of what might seem marginal questions about the edges of ownership. Empirical 
evidence suggests that a failure to provide a coherent and comprehensive ownership structure 
in the case of solid municipal waste can cause problems with the delineation between the 
rights of formal and informal participants in the waste reclamation process, and informal 
                                                 
98 Gregson et. al., above fn. 58, 224, citing B. Su, A. Heshmati, Y. Geng, & X. Yu, “A review of the circular 
economy in China: Moving from rhetoric to implementation” (2013) 42 Journal of Cleaner Production 215, 
217. 
99 Hieminga, above fn. 19, 32. 
100 ibid., 39. 
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participants may be threatened by ‘circular economy industrial strategies’.105 The importance 
of assessing the extent to which control will be maintained, and formalised relationships will 
prevail, is thus clear.  
This status of waste and how it is dealt with in a circular economy thus needs 
exploration. However, the breadth of methods for managing waste and the imbrication of 
domestic, European and international legislative frameworks on waste, render the topic one 
of confusion and complexity.106 The Waste Directive 2008 currently provides the basic 
regulatory framework,107 yet no single definition of “waste” appears sufficient.108 However, 
the Directive does define waste as ‘any substance or object which the holder discards or 
intends or is required to discard’,109 waste holders as ‘the waste producer or the natural or 
legal person who is in possession of the waste’.110 This article will not examine exhaustively 
the definition of waste,111 but will suggest that the important element of control is built into 
doctrine on waste. In the final analysis of the EU waste law regime, we can follow Scotford: 
any ‘clarity’ derived from the explicit setting out of priorities of waste is ‘complicated’ by 
qualifications of that prioritisation,112 and the delegation of assessment of the ‘life-cycle’ to 
Member States ‘according to their own methodologies and understandings of this concept’.113 
Shifting our focus to a different regime for waste can provide alternative ‘methodologies and 
understandings of [the life-cycle] concept’. English personal property law provides a 
framework which, though imperfect, does provide a workable structure for the reintegration 
of goods into the circular economy. This will be shown in the following section. The 
remainder of this sub-section sets up that discussion, by suggesting nhow global supply 
chains help generate a landscape onto which the tangible personal property framework can be 
placed to effectively deal with waste. 
 Whilst there is considerable scope for active corporate social responsibility in terms 
of managing and avoiding waste, various factors such as bounded rationality and ‘perverse 
incentives’ can restrict the likelihood of waste reduction.114 More generally we can 
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acknowledge the necessity of movement in commercial activity; we devote considerable 
resources to ‘facilitating exchange in the complex economic world of impersonal 
exchange’.115 Commercial law is about transactions,116 with a particular focus on repetitive, 
standardized contractual market-transactions between merchants. Examination of modern 
global supply chains demonstrates how breakages and interruptions in larger supply chains 
are merely diversions, rather than blockages.117 Ruptures in modern global supply chains 
generate waste, which in turn can create fluid low value supply chains which re-consume the 
waste.118 These alternative supply chains are in a constant state of flux, an interconnected 
process of waste creation and reconsumption.119 This process commodifies waste and the 
products of waste (i.e. new goods), requiring hard bargains to be drawn to maximise very thin 
profit margins.120 Bargains over highly disposable, and easily acquired, waste goods maintain 
‘movement within the commodity chain’, and it is this momentum which is vital to ‘plug 
gaps’ in profit generation processes.121  
The interconnections between economies and societies as to production and 
consumption shifts waste (of things and wasted usages of things),122 causing supply chains to 
alter shape and direction to follow that waste: low end commodity chains begin and end at 
places of waste,123 and waste regenerates itself back into something suitable for 
consumption.124 It is not hard to see the connection with, and benefit to, circular economies of 
such actions. What is more intriguing is the possibility that the underlying first principles of 
English personal property doctrine might work well with such process, at the chaotic end-
stages of chains of consumption, to re-integrate things into the flow of commerce. 
4. RELATIVITY OF TITLE, POSSESSORY TITLE, AND ABANDONMENT 
English property law’s value here could be in acting as a bridge rather than a barrier for the 
acquisition of waste to be a means for (re-)integration of products back into circular 
economies. Within common law systems, relativity of title is the governing mechanism for 
determining “ownership”.125 As Fox has argued, the principle of relativity of title applies to 
chattels, though to a lesser extent than it does to real property.126 It exists because of rules of 
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evidence and procedure, and it plays a vital role in resolving priority disputes:127 ‘relativity of 
title is about the respective enforceability of competing claims to vindicate the incidents of 
enjoyment inherent in some particular proprietary interest.’128 Various reasons can be given 
for relative title.129 The presumption of a legal title based on possession is valuable in cases 
where proving a valid title in a chain of transactions is difficult, and relative title based on 
possession provides an effective way to deal with possessory disputes, without having to 
resort to distinct ownership questions. 
As Fox put it: the finder’s title ‘arises as soon as he is in possession’.130 This 
strikingly simply point was, surprisingly, not subjected to sustained analysis until Hickey’s 
enlightening examination Possession and the Law of Finders.131 Hickey convincingly 
demonstrated that possession is sufficient to generate a right which in turn is sufficiently 
strong enough to constitute a legal right.132 Possession in relative-title systems is key, and this 
can be seen in both ancient and modern case-law.133  
 Following the Torts (Interferences with Goods) Act 1977, section 8, it is now possible 
to plead a superior title. This arguably provides English law with an ownership action similar 
to that found in civilian systems.134 This shift would seem to suggest that finders may have a 
limited level of protection, particularly as against the first person to sue them,135 and as such 
the capacity to reintegrate products back into economic use is restricted. This part of the 
procedural structure of English property law illustrates some linear tendencies, by introducing 
considerable obstacles in the way of acquiring goods; goods remain at the disposal of the 
original owner. Whilst the relativity of title enables control-powers to process down a chain 
of transactions, it remains the case that the true owner (or any relatively stronger party as 
against a relatively weaker party) can re-enter that chain, assert their relatively stronger 
claim, and reacquire the control-powers entailed by the relative strength of their claim.  
Yet at the margins of consumption English law still provides a means by which 
finders have a right over found goods.136 This is a precarious right,137 but it exists by virtue of 
(a) the underlying conceptual principle of relative possessory title and (b) the procedural 
requirements of section 8.138 This possessory interest fills the gap in the ownership 
continuum; it is this practical aspect which gives relative possessory title its social purpose. 
The law, and more importantly its subjects, does not have to retreat to abstract and 
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contestable claims of ownership. Proving relative possessory title is more likely if the goods 
are waste, which leads to the third limb in this area of law: abandonment.  
There are substantial difficulties facing finders of abandoned goods, not just in 
determining the elements of abandonment, but even the possibility of an effective 
abandonment. First, the law itself is unclear, being a conglomeration of various cases of 
sometimes limited or very narrow authority, with considerable interaction between private 
and public (essentially criminal) law issues.139 Second, the law lacks any coherent conceptual 
or principled basis, other than a highly unsatisfactory circular formula that abandonment is 
proven by actual abandonment combined with the intention to abandon.140 However, the faint 
but otherwise real possibility of abandonment allows finders to demonstrate that their 
possession can generate a sufficient and relatively-strong-enough interest (or right) in things 
to prevent goods from existing in a practical legal vacuum.141 This conceptual triptych of (i) 
possession as root of title, (ii) relativity of title, and (iii) abandonment provides goods with a 
route back into the flow of commerce. Arguably, English law provides a capturing 
mechanism – a sort of conceptual net – for goods at the margins.142 
Fractures in the process of creation, use, disposition, acquisition and so on are 
inevitable; the result is waste. The circular economy will prevent or heal such fractures, 
through various different mechanisms. It is possible to conceptualise the possible 
mechanisms into a tripartite hierarchical framework: the first order method is by regulation; 
the second order method is by contract; the third order is by property. The EU’s approach to 
circular economy, which broadly replicates that provided for dealings with waste generally, is 
to focus on providing a regulatory framework which will prevent the disposal of waste in 
non-use ways (e.g. landfill), as well as supporting targets for reuse and recycling, at the 
various stages of consumption. This first order method of regulation could well lead to an 
expansion of the contractual sphere as parties organise their operation within the governing 
regulatory framework. However, this is not the only way by which fractures can be resolved: 
the third order method looks to the underlying property regime, which provides a framework 
for acquiring goods that have for one reason or another escaped the primary and secondary 
capture-mechanisms of regulation and contract. The provision by English personal property 
law of a limited but otherwise operable capturing mechanism for marginalised waste is thus 
valuable to circular economics. It provides waste collection agencies and organisations with a 
foundation from which to operate. The possibility to become owners merely by acquiring 
possession provides a mechanism by which waste can be reintegrated into the economy. This 
can, to some extent, already be observed in food supply chains, where Midgley identifies 
‘lingering property rights and legal responsibilities’ with surplus food.143 These lingering 
rights blur the division between surplus and waste, with the effect that ‘surplus food is seen 
as the outcome of food chain inefficiencies, however, the control of what food is defined as 
surplus remains with the food industry.’144 
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5. CONCLUSION 
The relative absence of analysis of the legal implications of circular economic practices is 
troubling. This article has alluded to a number of potentially promising research avenues for 
specific issues. It has analysed the relationship between sharing and circular economies, and 
highlighted how circular economies can operate and function effectively within current legal 
frameworks.  
Dealings with waste are hierarchical: the first order is regulatory, the second 
contractual, the third property. English property law can transform waste into material 
suitable for manipulation by first or second order methods.145 The doctrinal triptych of 
relative title, possessory title and abandonment, provides a capturing mechanism for the 
potentially troublesome treatment of waste in circular economic practices. The regime closes 
up gaps, resolving ownership and use-claims in a way which produces the foundations for 
potential future commoditisation of the goods.  
In circular economy there is a form of industrialized commodification manipulating 
the disposal of goods at the margins.146 The stage of final consumption is simultaneously the 
stage of productive consumption: the “exit” of value from systems of exchange through their 
consumption and use by individuals is the immediate “entry” of value into systems of 
exchange as materials for the generation of goods and services.’147 English personal property 
law provides a strong foundation for circular economies, though whether this is a good thing 
is questionable.148  
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